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Hard Core Cartels aim to design, being aware of the presence of an an-
titrust authority, market practices granting avoidance of antitrust investi-
gations. We show, in a dynamic game, that they can reach this goal and get
extra—normal proﬁts. However, the bulk of this opportunity does not lay,
here, in limiting price changes across periods (as in Harrington [2004b]),
but rather in sending a signal to the authority which has a twofold eﬀect:
(1) it does make evident that cartel’s members are currently not engaged
in an “excessive” degree of collusion, (2) it credibly shows that this mod-
erate collusive activity has a persistence eﬀect, i.e. it will be maintained
also in future periods. We also show that antitrust remedies (e.g. behav-
ioral constraints or injunction reliefs) are more powerful, in limiting the
collusive activity, than ﬁnes. Last, we show that social welfare is higher
if Hard Core Cartels have limited information about the type of authority
(i.e. tough or accommodating) they are facing.
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11 Introduction
The OECD [2003] has recently released a report on “Hard Core Cartels” con-
ﬁrming that the harm they cause on welfare is very signiﬁcant and amounts to
the equivalent of billions of dollars each year world—wide.1 This evidence asks,
on the one hand, for a tougher antitrust policy; on the other hand, for a deeper
understanding of their business strategies explicitly adopted to avoid an antitrust
litigation.
Notwithstanding the relevance of these issues, only recently the economic
literature has begun to focus the attention on how a cartel, being fully aware that
an antitrust authority is active and may review its market conduct, might avoid
an investigation. More precisely, researchers have deeply analyzed the process
of cartel’s formation (either explicit or tacit) and its internal stability; but they
have generally omitted the analysis of a strategic game with two players: a cartel
and a public agency (henceforth the authority), where the latter has some devices
which may hinder the formation and the development of cartels. We tackle this
problem and analyze, by modeling a dynamic game, three distinct issues: (1)
the cartel’s sequence of moves adopted to reduce (or even rule out completely)
the probability of intervention by the authority. (2) Which instruments, among
those available, have a stronger eﬀect on the cartel’s behavior; (3) the role played
by informational asymmetries when they favor the authority, i.e. when the cartel
does not know which type of authority (tough or accommodating) is in charge of
the policy.
We show that the cartel may choose a sequence of moves (e.g. a price se-
quence) granting avoidance of the authority’s intervention but compatible with
extra—normal proﬁts. The sequence, to be eﬀective, must include a signal sent to
the authority which has a twofold eﬀect: (1) it does make evident that cartel’s
members are currently not engaged in an “excessive” degree of collusion. (2) It
credibly shows that such a moderate collusive activity will be maintained also
1“Hard core cartels” is the usual deﬁnition adopted by antitrust oﬃcers when they refer to
(horizontal) price—ﬁxing cartels. Examples are the lysine, vitamins. graphite electrodes cartels.
Their main feature, for the purpose of this paper, is that their members are fully aware of
illegality of their behavior, since they adopt strategies that aim to avoid antitrust disputes.
2in the future, i.e. collusion has a persistent eﬀect. We label the second eﬀect as
the “covenant” factor, i.e. an unwritten gentlemen agreement between cartel’s
members.2 The persistent eﬀect of collusion is a crucial factor to achieve the
no—intervention equilibrium since the authority can levy remedies in the event of
collusion yielding social beneﬁts3 only in future periods, i.e. not at the time where
the illegal activity is performed and the social damaged is generated. Hence the
authority has a strong incentive to intervene today in order to get an higher (dis-
counted) social beneﬁt in future. Only a credible covenant that the cartel will
hold next periods the same behavior observed and tolerated today may persuade
her from immediate investigation.
Moreover, we show that antitrust laws do increase the social welfare with re-
spect to the laissez faire case. The laws have a deterrence power because they
avoid that an “excessive” degree of collusion will be performed over time. How-
ever, among the traditional instruments available to ﬁght price—ﬁxing (see the
discussion in Section 2), we will point out that deterrence is mainly due to be-
havioral constraints (henceforth BC’s), while ﬁnes have only a limited deterrence
power. Indeed monetary sanctions are the object of an intense debate within the
profession (see Harrington [2004a]) and antitrust practitioners (OECD [2003]),
because they are usually much lower than collusive gains (hence they do not rep-
resent a credible threat to deter collusion) and they are very diﬃcult to compute
optimally (usually it is not possible to identify precisely the starting point and
hence the duration of the collusive period, the “but for price” level, etc.). BC’s,
known in laws discipline as “antitrust remedies” or “injunction reliefs”, have
been less investigated in the literature, even though there exists some empirical
evidence (Bizjak and Coles [1995]) displaying that they have a much stronger
impact than antitrust ﬁnes.4 BC’s have both deterrence and desistance power
2Hence no visible proof of conspiracy is given to the authority.
3An increase in the intensity of competition within the industry due to, e.g. the cartel’s
breakdown or, more generally, a reduction in the cartel’s conspiracy activity.
4They study the implications for shareholders of antitrust litigation in the US and show that
the threat of monetary ﬁnes (being imposed by the authority or being computed on the basis
of damages) has little power to explain the likelihood of settlement, while the central concern of
defendants is the potential prohibition of proﬁtable business practices through injunction reliefs.
3(see Motta and Polo [2003]); desistance arises because the authority, once that
ﬁrms have been proven guilty, is able to increase the intensity of competition (at
least temporarily) by imposing restrictions and remedies on ﬁrms’ behavior.5
Last, we highlight that society beneﬁts of a situation where informational
asymmetries favors the authority. More precisely, we show that if there exists a
suﬃciently high chance of facing a tough authority, the cartel loses some proﬁt
levels in comparison with the perfect information case. Moreover, under these
circumstances, it may even not be possible to avoid antitrust disputes.
The model presented here has strong links with a collection of recent papers
by Harrington [2004a,2 0 0 4 b, 2005]. He analyzes the impact of antitrust laws on
the cartel’s behavior in a dynamic model and shows [2005] that the cartel’s price
path is gradually increasing up to the steady—state level, and that the latter is
decreasing in the damage multiple and the probability of detection, while it is
independent of the level of ﬁxed ﬁnes.6 In another paper (Harrington [2004b]) he
takes into account the cartel’s internal stability (i.e. the incentive compatability
constraints ensuring that cheating is not optimal) and shows that antitrust laws
m a yh a v ep e r v e r s ee ﬀects on cartel’s pricing. More speciﬁcally, the cartel may
price above the steady—state level in the absence of antitrust laws because the
latter loose the incentive compatability constraints associated with collusion. He
also achieves an equilibrium where the cartel gets extra—normal proﬁts without
incurring in the authority’s intervention.
The main intuition underlying Harrington’s work on this topic is that cartels
anticipate that the detection probability is function of price changes (rather than
5Usually guilty ﬁrms have to submit reports on their “modiﬁed” market strategies and are
monitored for a certain period by antitrust oﬃcers.
6Hence if ﬁnes are the only penalty, the antitrust policy has no impact on the cartel’s
steady—state price. Harrington [2004a] investigates how the “before and after” approach for
calculating damages (in the US antitrust practice the damages due to collusion depend upon (1)
the observed collusive price, (2) the “but for” price, i.e. the price that would be charged without
collusion, (3) the market demand and (4) the length of the collusive period) inﬂuences the ﬁrms’
price path after the cartel has dissolved. He shows that ﬁrms price above the standard non—
collusive level and this results in an overestimate of the but for price and so an underestimate
of the collusive overcharge and antitrust damages.
4price levels), and so they design a price sequence that minimize the probability
of detection. This paper is an attempt to improve Harrington’s works on three
issues deserving more research eﬀorts: First, Harrington’s models do not consider
a strategic antitrust agent (e.g. an antitrust authority) whose actions have an
impact on the equilibrium. The antitrust side of the model is played by an
“automata” identiﬁed by an “helicoptered—in” probability of detection. Second,
in his papers detection is (exogenously) triggered by price changes: hence by
smoothing the price path the cartel may achieve extra—normal proﬁts without
being investigated. However, this assumption leads to a peculiar situation where,
if the cartel’s steady—state price level is reached without detection, ﬁrms continue
to price at such level forever without being inspected.7 Moreover, price levels do
matter in the authorities’ decisions.8 Third, there is an “ad hoc” assumption that
once investigation is initiated the cartel breaks down, which is in contrast with
the empirical evidence.9 No formal explanation of this eﬀect is provided.
Other papers have weaker connections with this contribution. Block, Nold
and Sidak [1981] study the eﬀect of antitrust laws on prices in a static model
where the probability of detection is increasing in the price levels; Salant [1987]
anticipates the perverse eﬀect of antitrust laws shown by Harrington [2004b]i na
static model where consumers know that they will receive higher reward if cartel’s
members are induced to increase the degree of collusion; Besanko and Spulber
[1989,1990], in a context where ﬁrms have private information about production
costs, consider the optimal antitrust policy when, respectively, an authority can
commit to an ex—ante probability of intervention and when consumers can get
treble damage rewards. Souam [1998, 2001] extends Besanko and Spulber [1989]
model by investigating the optimal policy when the antitrust authority has imper-
fect information over a continuous set of cartel’s eﬃciency states. Cyrenne [1999]
analyzes the impact of antitrust laws in the Green and Porter [1984] model of
7For instance, they will continue to price at the monopoly level without any suspicion of
conspiracy by the authority.
8Many antitrust disputes start because the authority believes that price levels in a given
sector are suspiciously high, rather than because she observe an anomalous price pattern.
9Bosch and Eckard [1991] report that of the 1300 ﬁrms indicted by the US Department of
Justice over 1962—1980, 14% were recidivists.
5tacit collusion with price wars.10 Other papers (Spagnolo [2000], Motta and Polo
[2003]) have recently explored the impact of leniency programs on ﬁrms’ incen-
tives to collude. However they do not considered that the probability of detection
depends upon the cartel’s pricing behavior.11
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the set of instruments
available to the authority in the event of horizontal price—ﬁxing and discusses their
implications for the modeling of the antitrust game in a dynamic context. Section
3 presents the model adopted in this paper, while Section 4 displays the perfect
information case and shows the cartel’s market behavior granting avoidance of
antitrust intervention. The analysis is then extended to a situation where the
cartel does not know the “type” of authority facing it (Section 5). Section 6
identiﬁes the optimal level of BC’s; Section 7 summarizes the paper and draws
some policy implications, while all the proofs are reported in the Appendix at
the end.
2 Fines and BC’s: critical discussion and modeling implications
Antitrust authorities have two instruments to ﬁght cartels: ﬁnes and remedies
(BC’s). The magnitude of the former varies according to the importance of the
detected illegal behavior and is usually related to proﬁts (especially in the US) or
to sales (Euroland).12 Antitrust ﬁnes are often considered, within the profession,
10Actually Cyrenne ends up to a quite trivial result: since penalties reduce the gains from
collusion, a shorter punishment phase, with respect to the laissez faire case, is required to avoid
deviation during the collusive phase. Hence antitrust laws increase the probability of collusion.
11Motta and Polo have a probability of auditing and a separate probability of detection. The
authority chooses between these two instruments given a budget constraint and being the ﬁrst
mover player in order to maximize social welfare. Hence both probabilities do not depend upon
t h ed e g r e eo fc o l l u s i o no b s e r v e di nt h em a r k e t .
12Souam [1998, 2001] has studied these two ﬁne regimes and has shown that ﬁnes related to
sales are more eﬃcient, in welfare terms, than ﬁnes linked with proﬁts when rents achievable
through collusion are not high. Achievable cartel proﬁts are those obtained along the equilib-
rium path in a model where the public agency in charge of the policy has limited information
about the cartel’s productive eﬃciency. When the distance between the most eﬃcient cartel’s
type and the less eﬃcient one is small, the proﬁt levels achievable through collusion are not
high.
6too small in comparison with the gains from collusion: the OECD states that,
“...o nas a m p l eo f1 1c a r t e l sd i s c o v e r e di nd i ﬀerent countries, the proportion of
sanctions to gains ranged from 3% to 189%. Seven cartels had sanction much
lower than the gains while none receives a ﬁne as large as three times the gains,
which is considered by many experts to be the optimum level.”13 Posner [1976,
p. 32] estimates that, on average, ﬁnes in the US are 0.21 percent of annual
sales involved in the conspiracy, McCutcheon [1997] that they are only about
0.6 percent of annual collusive proﬁts. Harrington [2004a, 2005] shows that ﬁnes
have no impact on the cartel’s steady—state price level. The OECD recommends
to link sanctions to a multiple of the damages suﬀered by plaintiﬀs, as in the US
private antitrust lawsuits, in order to increase the average ﬁne level. However,
damages are quite diﬃcult to compute, so that their level tend always not to be
suﬃciently high to prevent collusion; moreover, sanctions have an upper bound
related to ﬁrms limited liability.
Fines present some weaknesses on a theoretical ground too: when the author-
ity objective function is social welfare, ﬁnes are a pure monetary transfer from
colluding ﬁrms to consumers. In this case they do not represent for the authority
an incentive to ﬁght price—ﬁxing once it has been observed.14 That is, monetary
sanctions are not a remedy in the event of collusion; they have only a deterrence
power and no desistance eﬀect. Hence, for ﬁnes to be a credible threat, two alter-
native conditions must be meet: (1) the authority has to commit to an ex—ante
announced policy (e.g. a 20% parallel price increase by all ﬁrms in an industry
will surely trigger an investigation). (2) the authority must give diﬀerent weights
to consumer and producer surplus (e.g. her objective function is only consumer
surplus).
BC’s are instead prohibitions to perform some illegal acts imposed to ﬁrms,
and they are usually monitored by the authorities for some time after the ﬁnal
decision.15 These constraints have a direct eﬀect on ﬁrms’ market decisions, since
13OECD [2003] p. 28.
14A ﬁne does not modify the social welfare. Hence even if collusion is detected, the social
welfare is the same if antitrust policy is implemented or not.
15For instance, the ﬁnal decision might include the prohibition to exchange information about
costs, or to issue price lists, or to impose vertical restraints to retailers in order to reduce
7they modify, through agency’s monitoring of injunction reliefs, the cartel’s modus
operandi. Hence BC’s are a remedy in the event of collusion since they increase
the post—conviction intensity of competition. As it emerges from Bizjak and Coles
[1995], they reduce the proﬁtability of a conspiracy and act as a proﬁt ﬂoor.16
The idea that BC’s have a desistance eﬀect ﬁnds conﬁrmation in a rich em-
pirical literature on the consequences of antitrust policy against price—ﬁxing.
Feinberg [1980]17 and [1984]18 found that capital—adjusted price-cost margins in
1970 were signiﬁcantly lower, ceteris paribus,f o rﬁrms indicted for price—ﬁxing
between 1955 and 1970. The estimated eﬀect on after—indictment prices is lower-
ing the Lerner Index by two percentage points. The same results have been found
by Block, Nold and Sidak [1981];19 they underscored that increases in the An-
titrust Division’s inﬂation-adjusted budget have a signiﬁcant negative eﬀects on
markups of white bread.20 Choi and Philippatos [1983] have obtained the same
r e s u l ti nas t u d yo nas a m p l eo fU . S .l a r g eﬁrms indicted for violations of Sec-
tion I of the Sherman Act between 1958-72, matched with a group of unindicted
ﬁrms.21 Bizjak and Coles [1995], as mentioned before, emphasize that BC’s have
incentive to deviate between colluding ﬁrms.
16Alternatively, we might think that there exists a cost of collusion (e.g. the costs of cartel’s
formation and maintenance), as in Bradburd and Over [1982] and in Alexander [1994], and that
the antitrust activity increases this cost. Our results apply also to this alternative scenario.
17He analyzed a sample of U.S. 288 large manufacturing ﬁrms.
18He considers in this study t h et i m i n go fA n t i t r u s te ﬀects on pricing, and identiﬁes two
types of eﬀects: the deterrent eﬀects of Antitrust past indictments (ﬁrms think that the public
agency will screen past oﬀenders), and the ﬁrms’ strategic reaction (minimizing the probability
of conviction and the expected penalties) to an ongoing investigation and indictment.
19They studied the eﬀects of Antitrust indictments on prices in the U.S. white bread industry.
They look at prices for white pan bread across 208 observations: 12 major cities for 12 years
(1965-76) and other major cities for 8 years (1969-76).
20In addition, Department of Justice’s price ﬁxing prosecutions in the bread industry have
negative eﬀects on markups in the region (and the year) in which the case is ﬁled, and a
larger (what they call remedial) negative eﬀect in the city in which the action occurs, the year
following the start of the case. Their interpretation about these results is that, once discovered
and prosecuted, colluding ﬁrms remedy by reducing their markups in the following period.
21They showed that indicted ﬁrms do suﬀer for a reduction in proﬁts after the indictment,
and that this result applies only if the ﬁrms are indicted for the ﬁrst time. Once ﬁrms get used
to the Antitrust process, they do not care too much about it, and its enforcement power is
8strong power to explain the likelihood of settlement in US antitrust disputes.
The ﬁrst implication of including BC’s in the set of the authority’s instru-
ments (an issue not yet considered, to the best of my knowledge, in the litera-
ture, with the exception of Motta and Polo [2003]) is that the cartel/authority
interaction has to be modeled as a dynamic game, since BC’s show their eﬀects
after ﬁrms have been sanctioned. The second implication is that, while keep-
ing social welfare as the authority’s objective function, it is possible to relax the
ex—ante commitment hypothesis.22 By doing so we can model, more realistically,
the above interaction as a signaling game, where the authority’s intervention is
triggered when she believes, after receiving a signal from the market, that the
probability of an existing price—ﬁxing cartel is high. The same approach has
been recently adopted by Cyrenne [1999], Harrington [2004a,2 0 0 4 b, 2005], and
Martini and Rovesti [2004]; moreover, it is supported by the empirical evidence
provided by Hay and Kelley [1974]23, the OECD [2003], Levenstein and Suslow
[2001] and the Italian antitrust experience.24
For the above considerations we choose to model the cartel/authority game
as a two—stage/two—period signaling model where in each period ﬁrms are the
ﬁrst players to move (deciding whether to form a conspiracy to raise price or not)
and then the authority selects her action. This choice warrants further discussion
since it does not model the strategic interaction as an inﬁnite horizon game.25
much lower. It seems that the only eﬀect is in this case the monetary ﬁne.
22Besanko and Spulber [1989], Souam [1998, 2001] and Martin [2000] adopt this hypothesis
in their contributions.
23They ﬁnd that in the US detection was attributed to a complaint by a customer or a local,
state or federal agency in 13 of 49 price—ﬁxing case.
24The well known Nasdaq case was initiated by academics (see Christie and Schultz [1994]).
The recent graphite electrodes case began with a complaint from a steel manufacturer, the
famous vitamins case by a ﬁrm engaged in the conspiracy calling for a leniency program (see
Levenstein and Suslow [2001]). In Italy, among the 31 illegal agreements convicted by the
Italian authority over 1997—1999, 17 (54,8%) were initiated by private agents. The unique
announcement made ex—ante usually consists in what it is declared in the antitrust laws, where
agreements made to ﬁx prices are considered illegal (Grillo [2002]). Threshold intervention
prices or commitments to a probability of investigation are not announced.
25The results presented in this paper can be reproduced also in a dynamic model where at
the ﬁrst period players have to select their strategies and from the second period a continuation
9I believe that it provides a reasonable compromise between tractability and the
minimal structure to model dynamic interaction. Indeed a two—stage/two—period
model entails the minimum dynamics to analyze the impact of ﬁnes and BC’s on
the cartel’s behavior.26 Hence the model presented below does not consider the
usual (supergame style) individual incentive not to cheat the tacit agreement:
it focuses on the impact of antitrust laws on the ﬁrms’ joint decision to form a
cartel and at what level to increase prices.27
3T h e m o d e l
We consider a two—stage/two—period model where an industry composed by N
risk neutral ﬁrms produces an homogeneous good, with market demand p =1−q
(q =
PN
i=1 qi);28 the latter is the same in both periods and is common knowledge.
Firms have a common cost function Ci(qi)=θqi (i =1 ,...,N). As in Besanko
and Spulber [1989] and in Souam [1998, 2001], ﬁrms compete ´ al aBertrand and
decide whether to collude or not both at t =1a n da tt =2 . I ft h e yd on o t
collude, as in a standard ﬁnitely repeated game, they replicate in each period the
Bertrand equilibrium of the static game, i.e. pc = θ, qc =1− θ, qc
i = 1−θ
N ,a n d
make normal proﬁts.
We assume that ﬁrms have to pay a cost if their output is diﬀerent among
the two periods. The aggregate cost of changing production levels is equal to Ω.
Such a cost may be due to (1) adjustment costs, (2) collusive costs of changing
decision29 (as in Alexander [1994]) or (3) a combination of these two factors.
game takes place, conditional to the ﬁrst stage decisions.
26Since BC’s increase the costs of collusion after the conviction, two periods are the minimum
requirement to analyze their impact on the cartel’s strategy. By contrast, the role of ﬁnes may
be studies also in a static model, since they have only a deterrent eﬀect.
27The analysis of the impact of antitrust laws in supergame oligopoly model must include
other weapons (e.g. leniency programs) and it is left to future research.
28The assumption of linear demand is to simplify the analysis. The results are valid for any
speciﬁcation of market demand yielding a concave proﬁt function and social welfare function.
29If the cartel decides to change the price, members have to meet, spend time to reach a new
agreement and so on.
10Hence at t = 2, cartel’s costs are:
(
θq1 if q2 = q1
θq2 + Ω if q2 6= q1
If cartels are legal ﬁrms maximize industry proﬁts π =( 1− q)q − θq;h e n c e
dπ
dq =1 −2q−θ = 0. Solving the latter for q we get the monopoly output qm = 1−θ
2 ,
with qt (aggregate output at period t, t =1 ,2) equal to qm ∀t.W el a b e lqm as the
“fully collusive output”. In each period cartel’s proﬁts are π(qm)=
(1−θ)2
4 ,a n d
total proﬁts are (1 + δ)π(qm), where δ is the discount factor, which is assumed
to be the same for the cartel and the authority.
If instead cartels are forbidden, the sequence of events is the following: at
t = 1 the industry decides whether to collude or not (i.e. it chooses the aggregate
output q1); if a cartel is formed the authority, observing q1 and knowing market
demand, chooses whether to investigate (action {i})o rn o t( a c t i o n{ni}). If the
authority investigates the cartel is convicted to pay a ﬁne A(q1)=m[1 − q − θ]q
(m>1), i.e. a multiple of its proﬁts, to compensate the damage suﬀered by
consumers.30 Moreover, BC’s are imposed to the members, so that the cartel faces
a prohibition to adopt proﬁtable business practices and, consequently, suﬀers of
a reduction in its proﬁt possibilities. We assume that BC’s operates as a proﬁt
ﬂoor, so that the maximum feasible post—conviction proﬁts are equal to απ(qm),
with 0 ≤ α < 1.31 An investigation involves a ﬁxed cost K,w h i c hi sp a i db yt h e
authority. At t =2 ,b o t ht h eﬁrms and the authority observe the outcome of
the ﬁrst period and decide which actions to perform in the last two—stage period.
First ﬁrms decide q2, then the authority chooses between {i} and {ni}.
The authority’s objective function is social welfare W(q)=
R q
0 p(t)dt − θq.I f
Bertrand competition takes on at both periods, social welfare is at its maximum,
i.e. (1 + δ)W(qc)=( 1 + δ)
(1−θ)2
2 ; if cartels are legal social welfare is instead
30The analysis can be extended to a regime of ﬁne proportional to cartel’s sales, as in Souam
[2000]; in this case A0(q)=φ(1 − q)q (φ > 0).
31Ad e s i s t a n c ee ﬀect due to BC’s may also be obtained by assuming that there exist positive
costs of collusion, so that cartel’s costs are equal to: θq + c(qc − q). The higher the degree of
collusion the lower is q and the higher are the costs of organization, control and maintenance
of collusion. BC’s increase these costs, e.g. they become equal to: θq + d(qc − q), with d>c .
Our results also hold under this alternative framework.
11(1 + δ)W(qm)=( 1+δ)3
8(1 − θ)2. In this game a strategy for the cartel is the
choice of a pair of output levels {q1,q 2}, a strategy for the authority is, in each
period, the choice of a single action within the set {i,ni}. Before computing the
optimal policy under perfect information, we state two Lemmas which simplify
the analysis.
Lemma 1 At t =2the authority’s best reply to every cartel’s decision is {ni}.
Proof: see Appendix.
Lemma 1 shows that in the last two—stage period of the game the authority
will never investigate. The unique remedy in the event of collusion at t =2i st h e
ﬁne (BC’s are useless because they have no longer a desistance eﬀect). However,
since sanctions are a pure monetary transfer from producers to consumers, social
welfare is not modiﬁed by the investigation; hence the authority has no ex—post
incentive to investigate even if collusion is detected.32
Lemma 2 If at t =1q1 = qc the authority chooses {ni}.
Proof: see Appendix.
The authority knows market demand and so she can spot a competitive out-
put; in this case any investigation is useless, since no ﬁnes and BC’s can be
imposed. Hence producing the competitive output at t =1a n dt h e nqm at t =2
is a permanent option available to the cartel, whose proﬁts amount to, in this
case, δπ(qm). We label it as the “Late Monopoly solution”. Clearly, this solution
emerges because the dynamic game is truncated at the second period. However a
steady-state collusive solution where the cartel is not prosecuted by the authority
emerges also in a inﬁnite horizon game (Harrington [2004b]). The only diﬀerence
32Clearly, Lemma 1 holds in the general case where the authority’s objective function is social
welfare. If instead the authority maximizes consumers’ surplus or places diﬀerent weights on
consumers’ and ﬁrms’ surplus (with an higher weight on the former), she may ﬁnd optimal to
intervene also at t = 2. Section 5 explores the case where ﬁrms have imperfect information
about the authority’s objective function. The results presented in this Section are suﬃciently
general, since they have been obtained in a framework where the authority’s enforcement power
is at its minimum.
12here is that at the ﬁnal period the cartel might get the monopoly proﬁt( a n d
not a lower level as in Harrington [2004b]); however a limitation of the collusive
proﬁt under what we have called as the late monopoly solution will not change
signiﬁcantly the results.
4 Perfect information
The aim of this Section is to show the optimal policy in case of perfect informa-
tion. The extensive form of the game (given Lemmas 1—2) is shown in Figure 1.
The cartel makes the ﬁrst move: at C1 it chooses between Bertrand competition
(qc) and collusion: in the latter case q1 ∈ ]0,qc[. Then the authority selects her
intervention decision: at A1 she chooses {ni} (by Lemma 1), while at A2 we still
need to investigate what is her optimal option. This ends up stage 1. At the
beginning of stage 2 the cartel observes the history of the game and then takes
its output decision at the various nodes, anticipating that no investigations will
be performed at t = 2 (by Lemma 2). At C2 collusion prevails and qm is chosen.
This is the late monopoly solution path. At C3 choosing qm is not always the
best option: there exists a trade—oﬀ between the proﬁt increase due to an higher
degree of collusion and the adjustment costs. Hence also the option q2 = q1 is
considered at C3.A tC4 the cartel has been convicted at t = 1. Given that BC’s
have been imposed, it may choose between collusion (but with less proﬁtable
practices) and qc. Since the authority will not investigate at t =2 ,t h ec h o i c et o
collude will prevail as long as π(q2) − Ω ≥ 0. We need to identify, to solve the
game shown in Figure 1, a Subgame Perfect Equilibrium.
We ﬁrst compute, by working backwards, the cartel’s output level at C4.I n
case of collusion the cartel will set its output in order to achieve exactly the proﬁt
ﬂoor. We label this output level as the “desistance eﬀect output”, and denote it
as ˆ q,w h e r e
(1 − ˆ q)ˆ q − θˆ q =
α(1 − θ)2
4
Solving the above for ˆ q we get:
ˆ q =
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Figure 1: The extensive form of the game with perfect information
with qm < ˆ q<q c. We assume that π(ˆ q)−Ω ≥ 0, i.e. Ω <
α(1−θ)2










N e x t ,w eh a v et oi d e n t i f yt h ec a r t e ld e c i s i o na tn o d eC3 (Figure 1). Cartel’s
proﬁts are the following (note that if q2 6= q1, by Lemma 1 the Nash equilibrium




4 − Ω if q2 6= q1
(1 − q1)q1 − θq1 if q2 = q1
(2)
Changing the collusive output level will then be the cartel’s optimal decision if






> (1 − q1)q1 − θq1 | {z }
q26=q1
(3)
The r.h.s. of inequality (3) represents the “covenant”, i.e. a strategy where the
cartel is credibly engaged in keeping its output ﬁxed at t =2 . F i g u r e2p l o t s





qm if 0 ≤ q1 <q 2
1 or q1
































Note that if Ω ↑ then q1
1 → qc and q2
1 → 0; the higher the adjustment costs,
the larger is the interval where the cartel ﬁnds optimal to keep the production
level ﬁxed at both periods. Meanwhile, the closer is the ﬁrst—period output to qc,
the higher is the incentive to change the degree of collusion at t =2 ,s e t t i n gt h e
monopoly level. The intuition is that the lower is the ﬁrst—period proﬁt the higher
is the incentive to produce qm at t = 2, since the increase in proﬁt outweighs the
adjustment costs.
Taking into account the cartel’s best reply at I3 s h o w ni n( 4 ) ,w ec a nn o w
investigate the authority’s decision at A2 (Figure 1), the unique node where the
antitrust policy can be implemented under perfect information. If she chooses
action {i} welfare is W(q1) − K + δW(ˆ q), while if she selects {ni} welfare is
function of q1, as described in (4), i.e.

    
    
W(q1)+δW(qm)i f 0 ≤ q1 <q 2
1 or q1





15Expression (6) shows that we have two possibilities at node A2;i f0≤ q1 <q 2
1 or
q1
1 <q 1 ≤ qc investigation is a best reply if the following condition holds:
δ[W(ˆ q) − W(q
m)] >K ⇒ knife—edge condition (7)
If instead q2
1 ≤ q1 ≤ q1
1 {i} is a best reply if
δ[W(ˆ q) − W(q1)] >K ⇒ strategic condition (8)
Clearly, (7)—(8) require that δ 6= 0. We label (8) as strategic condition because it
depends upon the cartel’s behavior at t = 1; hence {ni} might be the authority’s
best reply if the cartel produces a level of output at the ﬁr s tp e r i o ds u c ht h a t
inequality (8) does not hold, with q2 = q1 ( t h e“ c o v e n a n t ” ) . W ec a ni n s t e a d
assume that inequality (7) is always fulﬁlled; if the opposite is true the authority
has never an incentive to investigate at t = 1. To see why, consider that {i} at
t =1y i e l d sW(q1) − K + δW(ˆ q), while {ni} gives W(q1)+δW(qm). Then if
δ[W(ˆ q)−W(qm)] ≤ K at t =1 ,{ni} always dominates {i}. In this case antitrust
policy is a trivial matter. Hence assuming that (7) always holds implies that if
the authority observes 0 ≤ q1 <q 2
1 or q1
1 <q 1 ≤ qc then {i} is always a best
reply.3334
We have now to identify the q1—range where expression (8) is not fulﬁlled, i.e.
where the no—intervention equilibrium might arise. Rewriting it as
δ
·








33This assumption rules out the possibility that q1 = qm;i nt h i sc a s e{i} dominates {ni} if
δ[W(ˆ q) − W(qm)] >K ,w h i c hi st h es a m ec o n d i t i o np r e s e n t e di ne x p r e s s i o n( 7 ) .
34It may seem odd that the authority investigates also if she observes at t = 1 an output
very close to the competitive level. This is due to her objective function, i.e. overall welfare
and not only current welfare. She knows that if cartel’s output at t =1i sc l o s et oqc,g i v e n
that {ni} will prevail at t = 2, it will then be limited to qm at t = 2, with a consistent welfare
reduction, given that the cartel’s adjustment costs are too small with respect to the proﬁt
increase. If instead at t = 1 cartel’s output is suﬃciently low, the authority might consider the
no—intervention option, since the cartel will not choose qm at t = 2: the adjustment costs oﬀset
the proﬁti n c r e a s e .
16and solving it for q1 we get:
q1 =( 1− θ) ±
q
δ2(1 − θ)2[2(1 −
√
1 − α) − α]+8 δK
2δ
(9)
Since no output greater than qc will be produced we have:




δ2(1 − θ)2[2(1 −
√
1 − α) − α]+8 δK
2δ
(10)
where q is deﬁned as the “covenant collusive output”. It is quite easy to show that
∂q
∂α < 0, so that an increase in BC’s (i.e. a reduction in α) leads to a tougher proﬁt
ﬂoor and to an increase in the covenant collusive output. Note that inequality
(8) is fulﬁlled if 0 ≤ q1 < q. H o w e v e rs i n c e( 8 )i st r u ef o rq2
1 ≤ q1 ≤ q1
1,w e
must have, for the covenant to be credible, that q2
1 ≤ q ≤ q1
1.35 Suppose for the
moment that there exists an output q such that q2
1 ≤ q ≤ q1
1 (a formal proof will




{i} if 0 ≤ q1 < q or q1
1 <q 1 ≤ qc
{ni} if q ≤ q1 ≤ q1
1
(11)
Expression (11) highlights an interesting feature of the authority’s behavior at
t = 1: the intervention decision has a non—monotonic relation with q1.I tw o u l d
have been reasonable to expect that the probability of intervention increases as
the observed output decreases. We have instead shown that the authority will
investigate if the observed output is high or low, while she chooses not to intervene
when the output is at an intermediate level. This non—monotonic relation is due
to the trade—oﬀ between BC’s desistance eﬀect and the “covenant” persistence
eﬀect (the same degree of collusion observed today will persist also in the future).
If q1 is very high or too low (and so qm will prevail at t = 2) the authority chooses
the desistance eﬀect (she imposes BC’s and so avoids qm at t =2 ) ;i fq1 is at
an intermediate level she opts for the persistence eﬀect, i.e. the “covenant” (the
investigation costs would not cover the discounted net gains from investigation).
35By inspection of (10)
∂q
∂K < 0, and so there exists a level of antitrust’s costs K such that
q2
1 ≤ q = q1
1. Hence if K ≥ K we know that the authority’s best reply at A2 is {ni}.
17The last decision to analyze is the cartel’s choice at C1.T h r e ed i ﬀerent options
are feasible: (1) {q1 = qc,q 2 = qm},( 2 ){0 <q 1 < q,q2 =ˆ q} or {q1
1 <q 1 <q c,q 2 =
ˆ q} and (3) {q1 = q2 = q}.36 Option (1) is the late monopoly solution and yields:
δ[π(q
m) − Ω]( 1 2 )
i.e. the cartel sacriﬁces some proﬁts at t = 1 to enjoy discounted monopoly proﬁts




π(q1)+δ[π(ˆ q) − Ω]( 1 3 )
while under option (3) (the “covenant strategy”) overall proﬁts are:
(1 + δ)π(q) ⇒ covenant proﬁts (14)
We can now state the following Lemma:
Lemma 3 Producing {0 <q 1 < q} or {q1
1 <q 1 <q c} at t =1(i.e. option (2))
yields positive aggregate proﬁts only if:












(m − 1)2(1 − θ)2 − 4δ(m − 1)[π(ˆ q) − Ω]
2(m − 1)
<q 1 < 1 − θ
with
m>
4(1 + δ)Ω − (1 − θ)2 − 4δπ(ˆ q)
4Ω − (1 − θ)2 (15)
36Note that in the interval q ≤ q1 ≤ q1
1 cartel’s proﬁts are decreasing in q1,s ot h a tq maximizes
them.
18Proof: see Appendix.
Lemma 3 shows that colluding at t = 1 and being investigated by the authority
might be proﬁtable. The intuition is the following: even if m is high the eﬀective
sanction paid by the cartel is small if at t = 1 the collusive output is close to the
competitive level (or to 0). Moreover, future net proﬁts are positive (i.e. π(ˆ q) −
Ω > 0) and larger than the ﬁrst period losses. Condition (15) implies that the






However option (2) is dominated by the other two strategies available at C1.
Indeed option (1) is better than (2) if δ[π(qm)−Ω] > (1−m)π(q1)+δ[π(ˆ q)−Ω]
(with 0 <q 1 <q 2
1 or q1
1 <q 1 <q c), that is if:
δ[π(q
m) − π(ˆ q)]
| {z }
>0
> (1 − m)π(q1)
| {z }
<0
which is always true. Option (3) is better than (2) if (1+δ)π(q) > (1−m)π(q1)+
δ[π(ˆ q) − Ω], i.e. if:
π(q)+δ[π(q) − π(ˆ q)]
| {z }
>0




which, again, it is always veriﬁed (provided that there exists an output q such
that q2
1 ≤ q ≤ q1
1). Hence the only two options that the cartel will consider at C1
are {q1 = qc,q 2 = qm} (late monopoly) and {q1 = q2 = q} (the covenant). We
can now establish the equilibrium under perfect information.
Proposition 1 The authority never investigates in case of perfect information.
There exist two equilibria:
(1) the covenant equilibrium, i.e. {q1 = q2 = q}, {ni,ni},i f
Ω ≥
·
δ(1 − θ) −
q
δ2(1 − θ)2[2(1 −
√
1 − α) − α]+8 δK
¸2
4δ2 (16)
(2) the late monopoly solution, i.e. {q1 = qc,q 2 = qm}, {ni,ni}, if condition (16)
does not hold.
19Proof: See Appendix.
Proposition 1 shows that in case of perfect information a little degree of
collusion is always tolerated even if the authority can impose injunction reliefs
that yield a desistance eﬀect. Under the covenant equilibrium (1) the cartel
produces an output level that induces the authority not to investigate also at
the ﬁrst period, since this output yields a persistence eﬀe c t( t h es a m ed e g r e eo f
collusion will be maintained at t = 2 when antitrust policy has less enforcement
power). The intuition is simple: trying to induce the authority not to investigate
is better than the late monopoly solution because the covenant equilibrium yields
strictly positive short—run gains (choosing the competitive output at t =1g i v e s
normal proﬁt) while it may produce long—run gross losses (i.e. not considering
the adjustment costs) only if the discount factor is suﬃciently high. However it
yields also strictly positive long—run net gains (i.e. taking into account of Ω), so
that, if feasible, it always dominates the alternative strategy.
This result conﬁrms Harrington’s [2004b] intuition that the cartel may choose
ad hoc strategies to avoid the possibility of antitrust investigation. However the
bulk of this opportunity does not lay, in this case, in limiting price changes across
periods, but rather in committing itself to a low degree of collusion forever, i.e.
in sending the signal that no price changes from the “tolerated” level will ever be
observed. Last, Proposition 1 highlights that antitrust policy is eﬀective against
collusion even if it is implemented in a discretionary way (i.e. social welfare is
higher than in case of laissez faire). Its eﬀectiveness is mainly due to BC’s:
their desistance eﬀe c ti sak e yf a c t o ra ﬀecting the cartel’s optimal behavior. This
conﬁrms some empirical ﬁndings (e.g. Bizjak and Coles [1995]) that BC’s are the
main concern of defendants in antitrust disputes.
In this Section we have assumed that the policy parameters are exogenous,
especially the impact of BC’s (the level of α). We have highlighted here that
BC’s have an impact on the equilibrium, since their level inﬂuences the covenant
collusive output, and so, in principle, they may cause the covenant equilibrium to
fail. Hence it is interesting to analyze which is the level of BC’s that maximizes
welfare. The latter under the covenant equilibrium is WCOV =( 1 + δ)W(q), while
in case of late monopoly is equal to WLM = W(qc)+δW(qm). The optimal level
20of BC’s will be analyzed in Section 6.
4.1 An example: calibration of the model
In this Section we provide a calibration of the model, which may be useful to
understand the economic intuition of the covenant equilibrium and the impact
of some variables, e.g. adjustment and policy costs, that inﬂuence the equilib-
rium outcomes. Table 1 provides a summary of the parameters adopted in this
examples and of output, proﬁt and welfare in case of Bertrand equilibrium and
monopoly equilibrium (i.e. the “fully collusive output”). We assume that adjust-
ment costs are about 7% of unit costs, that investigation costs are about 16% of
the monopoly proﬁt, that BC’s limit proﬁts to 20% of the monopoly proﬁta n d
that both the cartel and the authority have an high discount factor (δ =0 .95).
θ =0 .3 Ω =0 .023 K =0 .02 α =0 .2 δ =0 .95
qc =0 .7 qm =0 .35 π(qm)=0 .1225 W(qc)=0 .245 W(qm)=0 .18375
Table 1: Model’s calibration under perfect information
It follows, by substituting the relevant parameters in (1), (5) and (10), that
ˆ q =0 .6630,q 1
1 =0 .5017,q 2
1 =0 .1983, q =0 .4915, with π(ˆ q)=0 .0245,W (ˆ q)=
0.2443, π(q)=0 .1025,W (q)=0 .2233. Given q1
1 and q2
1,w eh a v et h a tq2 =
qm =0 .35 if 0 <q 1 < 0.1983 or if 0.5017 <q 1 < 0.7, while q2 = q1 if 0.1983 ≤
q1 ≤ 0.5017. The knife—edge condition (7) is fulﬁlled in this example, since
0.95(0.2443 − 0.18375) = 0.0575 > 0.02, as well as the strategic condition (8)
since 0.95(0.2443 − 0.2233) = 0.021 < 0.02. Hence from (11) we have that the
antitrust policy at t =1i s :
(
{i} if 0 ≤ q1 < 0.4915 or 0.5017 <q 1 ≤ 0.7
{ni} if 0.4915 ≤ q1 ≤ 0.5017
Last, if at C1 the cartel chooses option (1) (late monopoly solution) gets
0.95(0.1225-0.023)=0.094525, while option (3) (the covenant equilibrium) yields
1.95(0.1025)=0.1998, that clearly dominates the former. Note that WCOV =
(1 + 0.95)0.223 = 0.435 while LM =0 .245 + 0.95(0.18375) = 0.420, so that
WCOV >W LM.
215 Limited information on authority’s type
The aim of this Section is to explore the impact on the equilibria identiﬁed in
Proposition 1 of limited information about the type of authority (i.e. “tough” or
“accommodating”) the cartel is facing. In particular, we model a tough authority
as one with negligible investigation costs (i.e. K =0 ) . 37 This implies that a tough
authority will always investigate. On the contrary, the authority may incur in
positive policy costs (K>0); this type must balance her preference towards
a more competitive behavior with her non—negligible policy costs; under these
circumstances a covenant equilibrium may arise and so the authority has an
accommodating behavior. We deﬁne type A as the tough authority (K =0 )a n d
type B as the accommodating one (K>0). Moreover we assume that condition
(16) holds, so that, when facing a type B authority, the covenant equilibrium
(q1 = q2 = q) arises.
We assume that Nature selects the authority’s type and reveals it to her, while
the cartel has only a (common knowledge) probability distribution over the two
possible types, with η = Prob(K = 0). Given these assumptions and looking
for a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE),38 we ﬁrst highlight that at the last
stage of the game the two authority types hold a separating behavior: type A
chooses {i} for 0 <q 2 ≤ qc, while type B selects {ni} for 0 <q 2 ≤ qc (by Lemma
1). By moving backwards, the cartel’s behavior at t = 2 depends upon both its
production level at t = 1 and the authority’s decision once q1 is observed.
Figure 3 presents the feasible cartel’s decisions at t = 1 and the corresponding
behavior of the two authority types. If q1 ∈ ]0,q[o ri fq1 ∈ ]q1
1,qc[b o t ht y p e s
selects {i} at t =1( pooling behavior). Hence ﬁrms at t = 2 still do not know
whether they face a tough authority or not. By applying Bayes Rule the posterior
37It is the same to assume that the authority’s objective function is given only by consumer
surplus.
38It is well known that a PBE satisﬁes three conditions: (1) for each type i (i = A,B)
the authority’s investigation strategy is a best response to the cartel’s strategy, (2) for each
authority’s moves the cartel’s strategy maximizes, given its beliefs about the authority type,
its overall proﬁts and (3) for each authority’s moves on the equilibrium path, the cartel’s belief
are consistent with Bayes Rule and with the authority’s equilibrium strategy.
22- q1
qc q1
1 q qm q2
1 0
Type B {i} ¾ - {ni} ¾ - {i} ¾ -
Type A {i} ¾ -
Figure 3: Authority’s decisions at t =1 :pooling and separating behaviors
beliefs about the two types coincide with the priors.39 The cartel has, in this case,
two options available at t =2 :( 1 )q2 = qc,( 2 )q2 =ˆ q.40 Option (1) implies that
no collusion takes place at t =2a n dﬁrms make normal proﬁts; if q2 =ˆ q the
cartel will face type A with probability η and so it will be investigated, while
with probability 1 − η it will observe {ni} at t = 2 (it faces type B). Hence we
can state the following Lemma.
Lemma 4 Choosing q2 =ˆ q after q1 ∈ ]0,q[ or after q1 ∈ ]q1







If (17) holds the cartel’s overall proﬁts if q1 ∈ ]0,q[o rq1 ∈ ]q1
1,q c[a r ee q u a l
to:
η(1 − m)π(q1)+( 1− η)(1 − m)π(q1)+δ(1 − ηm)[π(ˆ q) − Ω]
39If we deﬁne %i as the probability that a type i (i = A,B)a u t h o r i t yc h o o s e s{i} after
q1 ∈ ]0,q[o ra f t e rq1 ∈ ]q1
1,qc[, and $(A|{i}) as the posterior probability that the authority
is of type A after having observed the previous moves, we get, by Bayes Rule,
$(A|{i})=
%Aη
%Aη + %B(1 − η)
=
(1)η
(1)η)+( 1 ) ( 1− η)
= η.
40BC’s are imposed at t = 1, so the only feasible collusive output at t =2i sˆ q.
23Rearranging the above expression we get:
(1 − m)π(q1)+δ(1 − ηm)[π(ˆ q) − Ω]( 1 8 )
By applying again the same procedure shown in Lemma 3 it is possible to demon-
strate that (18) yields positive overall proﬁts if the following conditions hold:












(m − 1)2(1 − θ)2 − 4δ(m − 1)(1 − ηm)[π(ˆ q) − Ω]
2(m − 1)
<q 1 < 1 − θ
with
m>
4(1 + δ)Ω − (1 − θ)2 − 4δπ(ˆ q)
4(1 + δη)Ω − (1 − θ)2 − 4δηπ(ˆ q)
If instead (17) is not true the cartel never selects an output q1 ∈ ]0,q[o rq1 ∈
]q1
1,qc[ since this strategy yields (1 − m)π(q1) ¿ 0.
Figure 3 shows that the cartel may choose q1 = q and that the two authority
types will respond diﬀerently to this choose: type A investigates, while type B
selects {ni} (separating behavior). In this case the behavior of the two types
reveals to the cartel whether the authority is tough or not and so the cartel will
set q2 = qc if {i} is observed at t =1a n dq2 = q if {ni} is implemented at the
ﬁrst stage. The cartel’s overall proﬁts are:
η[(1 − m)π(q)+0 ]+( 1− η)(1 + δ)π(q)
which can be written as:
[1 + δ − η(m + δ)]π(q)( 1 9 )





24Moreover, Figure 3 points out that also choosing q1 ∈ ]q,q1
1] induces a sep-
arating behavior by the two types (type A’s reply is {i} while type B responds
with {ni}) and yields the following overall proﬁts (after rearranging them):
[1 + δ − η(m + δ)]π(q1). (21)
The latter is, on the one hand, positive only if η < η1; on the other hand, it
is always dominated by q1 = q since π(q) À π(q1).41 The last option available
to the cartel is q1 = qc (see Figure 3). Again the two types have a separating
behavior and so the cartel’s overall proﬁts are:
η(0) + (1 − η)δ[π(q
m) − Ω]( 2 2 )
To sum up, the cartel’s moves at t = 2 are the following ones:

             
             
q2 = qm if q1 = qc and {ni}
q2 = q if q1 = q and {ni}
q2 = q1 if q1 ∈ ]q,q1
1]a n d{ni}
q2 =ˆ q if q1 ∈ ]0,q[o rq1 ∈ ]q1
1,qc[a n dη ≤ 1
m
q2 = qc if

   
   
q1 ∈ ]0,q[o rq1 ∈ ]q1
1,qc[a n dη > 1
m
q1 = q and {i}
q1 ∈ ]q,q1
1]a n d{i}
q1 = qc and {i}
We are now in the position to state the PBE if asymmetric information favors
the authority.
Proposition 2 In case of limited information on authority’s type there exist two
fully separating PBE:
(i) if η ≤ η2,w h e r e
η2 =
δ[π(qm) − Ω] − (1 + δ)π(q)
δ[π(qm) − Ω] − (m + δ)π(q)
;( 2 3 )
41By comparing (19) and (21) it is evident that the former dominates the latter if π(q) >
π(q1) . B u tt h i si sa l w a y st r u es i n c eπ(.) is a concave function and qm < q<q 1,g i v e nt h a t
q1 ∈ ]q,q1
1].
25then q1 = q,
q2 =
(
q if {ni} at t=1
qc if {i} at t=1
type A selects {i} at both periods, type B chooses {ni} at both periods;
(ii) if η > η2,t h e nq1 = qc,
q2 =
(
qm if {ni} at t=1
qc if {i} at t=1
type A selects {i} at both periods, type B chooses {ni} at both periods.
Proof: See Appendix.
Proposition 2 points out that the covenant equilibrium may be implemented
in this limited information context only if the probability that the cartel is facing
a tough authority is suﬃciently low and if the cartel observes that the authority
does not investigate at q. On the contrary, an investigation once that q is observed
reveals to the cartel that it is facing the type A authority, and so any credible
covenant will be ineﬀective. Under these circumstances the cartel’s best reply
at t = 2 is to unfasten the agreement and produce qc.W e l a b e l PBEi as the
“covenant with intervention” equilibrium, since even if the probability of facing
a tough authority is low, we might observe an antitrust investigation along the
equilibrium path.
Moreover Proposition 2 highlights that also the late monopoly equilibrium is
not always available here, since the tough authority always investigates. This
implies that delaying the formation of the cartel at t = 2 is a feasible choice
only if no investigation is observed at t = 1 in presence of a non—cooperative
equilibrium outcome. We label this equilibrium as PBEii, and in this case, if the
authority is tough, a price—ﬁxing conspiration is never realized.
The above Proposition shows that the optimal cartel’s strategy at t =1h a s
a “bang—bang” property, as shown in Figure 4: if the probability of facing a
tough authority is small, the cartel will try to induce the covenant equilibrium.
If instead the opposite is true, a ﬁrst—best outcome is reached at the ﬁrst period,









Figure 4: Cartel’s output at t = 1 with limited information
underscores that the authority can beneﬁt from the presence of uncertainty about
her opportunity costs in ﬁghting collusion: a suﬃciently high chance that the
authority has strong preferences towards marginal costs pricing will force the
cartel to lose some proﬁts, since in case of perfect information the outcome would
always have been q1 = q2 = q, i.e. a little degree of collusion would be tolerated.
If PBEi arises, cartel’s proﬁts are lower than under perfect information, while
welfare is equal to: Wi =[ 1+δ(1 − η)]W(q)+ηδW(qc), which is always greater
than that obtained in case of perfect information, since:
W
i =[ 1+δ(1 − η)]W(q)+ηδW(q
c) > (1 + δ)W(q)=W
COV
given that W(qc) À W(q). Furthermore under PBEii cartel’s proﬁts are again
lower than those arising in case of perfect information, while welfare is equal to:
Wii =( 1+δη)W(qc)+δ(1−η)W(qm). The following Lemma states the ranking
between W ii and W COV.
Lemma 5 Wii ≥ WCOV if (i) W COV <W LM; otherwise if (ii) η ≤ η3,w h e r e
η3 =




H e n c eu n d e rb o t ht h ef e a s i b l ee q u i l i b r i aarising with limited information wel-
fare is greater than that prevailing under the perfect information covenant equilib-
rium. This implies that society always beneﬁts if asymmetric information favors
the authority.
5.1 Model’s calibration under limited information on authority policy
costs
In this Section we extend the example discussed in Section 4.1 to the limited
information case. In case of perfect information we have: q1 = q2 =0 .491,
π =0 .1998, W =0 .435 (see Table 1 and Section 4.1). From (20) and from (23)
we have that η1 =0 .494 and η2 =0 .3 3 9 .H e n c eb yP r o p o s i t i o n2w eh a v et h a t
PBEi arises if 0 ≤ η ≤ 0.339 and that PBEii prevails if 0.339 < η ≤ 1. Under
PBEi we have: q1 =0 .491 while
q2 =
(
0.491 if {ni} at t =1
0.7 otherwise
Under PBEii we have instead: q1 =0 .7a n d
q2 =
(
0.35 if {ni} at t =1
0.7o t h e r w i s e
Perfect information Limited Information
π 0.1998 0.1998—0.062
(η =0 ) — ( η =0 .339)
0.062—0
(η =0 .34)—(η =1 )
W 0.435 0.435—0.439
(η =0 ) — ( η =0 .339)
0.439—0.478
(η =0 .34)—(η =1 )
Table 2: Model’s calibration under limited information on authority’s type
Table 2 shows how cartel’s overall proﬁts and welfare vary according to η and
to the prevailing equilibrium, and it compares them with the perfect information
28case. It is evident that as long as η 6= 0 cartel’s proﬁts are lower than those
arising with perfect information, while welfare is higher.
6 Optimal level of BC’s
The aim of this Section is to identify the level of BC’s that maximizes welfare
both in case of perfect and asymmetric information. The previous analysis has
highlighted that (1) the cartel may induce a solution where the authority never
investigates by making a credible covenant (i.e. the observed collusive solution
is persistent) and that (2) the authority can improve the eﬃciency if she has an
informational rent. However in the previous Sections the level of BC’s was ex-
ogenous: now we relax this assumption and compute endogenously their optimal
level. This implies a change in the timeline of the game: the authority makes the
ﬁrst move by choosing the proﬁt ﬂoor in case of conviction, and strictly commits
to it. The remaining of the game is as before. First we compute the optimal level
of α in case of perfect information.
6.1 The perfect information case










































































(1 + δ)(1 − θ)2
1+α3/2 < 0
so that welfare under the covenant equilibrium is decreasing in α and its maximum
is at α = 0 (corner solution). However, since by condition (16) in Proposition 1,
BC’s have an impact on q and so on the existence of a covenant equilibrium, it is
now useful to rewrite (16), in order to highlight the role of the policy parameters
(instead of the cartel’s adjustment costs):
K ≥
δ{[(1 − θ) − 2Ω1/2]2 − (1 − θ)2[2(1 −
√
1 − α) − α]}
8
≡ Λ (28)
Expression (28) points out that there exists a trade—oﬀ between the two relevant
policy parameters (i.e. K and α), so that a tougher level of BC’s (a reduction in
α)m u s tn o ty i e l dt h a tK<Λ if the authority also wants a covenant equilibrium
to prevail. Otherwise, since an output q ≤ q1
1 no longer exists, the cartel will
select the late monopoly solution. Note that:
Λ(α =0 )=


























(1 − α)3/2 − 1 < 0
30Moreover, χ > Υ, since it is easy to show that χ À 0 while Υ ¿ 0. Hence
condition (28) is a decreasing function of α, i.e. the higher the BC’s level (the
lower is α) the higher must be the policy costs K. Furthermore, if α =1 ,s i n c e
Υ ¿ 0, we have that K ≥ Υ is always satisﬁed. To identify the α—range where a





2 − 2(1 − θ)
2 +2 ( 1− θ)
2√
1 − α +( 1− θ)
2α
The following Lemma identiﬁes the interval where BC’s induce a covenant equi-
librium.
Lemma 6 A covenant equilibrium as function of BC’s exists ∀α ∈ [0,1] if K ≥
χ; otherwise it exists if α0 ≤ α ≤ 1,w h e r e
α
0 ≡ 1 −
(1 − θ −
√
H)2
(1 − θ)2 (31)
and H ≡ A2 − 8K
δ .
Proof: See Appendix.
Proposition 1 points out that we can also have a late monopoly solution:
welfare in this case is independent of α, since an investigation is never a credible












(4 + 3δ)( 3 2 )
We can now state when the covenant equilibrium dominates the late monopoly
solution in welfare terms.
Proposition 3 Welfare is higher under the covenant equilibrium than under the
late monopoly solution if (1) policy costs are suﬃciently small, (2) the discount










2K[2K +( 1− θ)2]
(1 − θ)2 (35)
and if
0 ≤ α ≤ α (36)
where












Proposition 3 points out that in case of perfect information welfare is greater
under the covenant equilibrium than under the late monopoly solution if policy
costs are suﬃciently small, the authority is suﬃciently patient and BC’s are not
too soft. The condition regarding the level of the policy costs is more stringent: if
(33) is not satisﬁed then the late monopoly solution is better than the covenant
equilibrium independently of the discount factor and of the BC’s levels. The
intuition is the following: an increase in K leads to a reduction in the covenant
collusive output, so that the covenant equilibrium becomes more costly for society.
On the contrary, policy costs have no eﬀect on the late monopoly solution, and
so the higher is K the more likely is that the authority prefers a competitive
solution at the ﬁrst period and full collusion in the future rather than a costly
limited degree of collusion.
However, Proposition 3 illustrates the ranking between the two possible equi-
libria but understates that the prevailing equilibrium is chosen by the cartel, hav-
ing seen the ex—ante announced level of BC’s. In other words, the late monopoly
32solution may dominates the covenant equilibrium in welfare terms but the latter
is the prevailing one (and vice versa), because the cartel chooses it since it is more
proﬁtable. We have in this case a third—best solution.42 Hence it is interesting
to analyze whether the authority can commit herself to a level of α that modiﬁes
the decentralized equilibrium and that restores the second—best welfare (i.e. the
ranking identiﬁed in Proposition 3). To get this result it is useful to highlight the
relation between χ and Φ, and between α and α0.
Lemma 7 χ < Φ iﬀ
δ <
(1 − θ)2
2[(1 − θ) − 2Ω1/2]2 (39)
Moreover, α < α0 if K ≥ χ; otherwise iﬀ K<Γ and
δ >
A2
(1 − θ)2 − A2 (40)
where
Γ ≡




We can now state the optimal policy for BC’s in case of perfect information.
Proposition 4 In case of perfect information BC’s are always eﬀective since
they modify the decentralized equilibrium. The optimal level of BC’s is: α∗ = α0
if (39) holds and
{K<χ ≤ Φ (or K ≤ Φ < χ), δ2 ≤ δ ≤ 1};( 4 2 )
otherwise α∗ =0 . Last, a third best welfare is achieved (i.e. a second best welfare
cannot be restored) either when WCOV <W LM but the covenant equilibrium exists
independently of α or when W COV ≥ WLM but α ¿ α0.
42First—best is achieved at marginal cost pricing, while second—best is identiﬁed by Proposi-
tion 3.
33Proof: See Appendix.
Proposition 4 shows that even if the authority can precommit to a BC’s level,
she is not always able to achieve a second best outcome pricing, even if the
adoption of BC’s always allow to change the decentralized equilibrium, i.e. BC’s
have indeed a direct eﬀect on the cartel’s decisions. A second best welfare can be
achieved either when WLM >W COV independently of the BC’s level and setting
them at a tough level the authority destroy the covenant equilibrium (that will
instead prevail if α is suﬃciently high); or when WCOV ≥ W LM if α is suﬃciently
low and so the authority reaches this goal by ﬁxing the toughest level of BC’s
compatible with the existence of a covenant equilibrium (i.e. either α∗ =0o r
α∗ = α0). Antitrust policy achieves a third best welfare either if WCOV <W LM
but it is not possible to destroy the covenant equilibrium or if W COV ≥ WLM
but the cartel requires, to implement a covenant equilibrium, a level of BC’s
suﬃciently low, that the authority is not willing to grant. Now we analyze the
optimal level of BC’s in case of limited information about the type of authority
facing the cartel.
6.2 The case with limited information on authority’s policy costs
If the cartel does not know whether the authority is tough or accommodating the
timing of the game is the following: First the authority announces the level of α
and commits to it, then the Nature selects the authority’s type and communicates
it to the authority, then the game proceeds as in Section 5. We assume that BC’s
are regarded by the authority, independently of her type, as a general antitrust
guideline, and so there exists a unique level of α. The two types have instead a
diﬀerent attitude toward investigation, as explained in Section 5.
The PBEi (see Proposition 2) yields the following expected welfare: Wi =
[1 + δ(1 − η)]W(q)+ηδW(qc). The latter can be written as
W





































As in the perfect information case, it is easy to show that Wi|α=0 À Wi|α=1
and that ∂Wi
∂α < 0, ∂2Wi
∂α2 < 0. Again, expression (28) represents the condition
for existence of PBEi as function of the policy parameters K and α,a n dt h e
thresholds χ and Υ play a crucial role in the identiﬁcation of the optimal policy;
last, Lemma 6 still hold. The PBEii) (again from Proposition 2) gives instead





(4 + 3δ + δη)( 4 6 )
which is, in this case, independent of α. Tedious computations allow to set




(1 + 3δη) > −[1 + δ(1 − η)]
K
δ
If we compare instead Wi|α=0 and Wii w eg e tt h a tt h ef o r m e ri sg r e a t e rt h a n
the latter if the following inequality is satisﬁed:






Since the l.h.s. of the above inequality is positive or equal to 0 if η > 1
5, while the
r.h.s. is negative, we can state in the following Proposition the ranking between
the two equilibria.
Proposition 5 If the cartel has limited information about the type of authority
is facing, Wii >W i ∀α ∈ [0,1] if η ≥ 1
5.I fi n s t e a dη < 1
5 then W i ≥ Wii if (1)
policy costs are suﬃciently small, (2) the discount factor is suﬃciently high and
( 3 )B C ’ sa r en o tt o os o f t ,i . e .i ﬀ
K ≤
(1 − θ)2(1 − 5η)









4(1 − η)K +2
q
2K[2K(1 − η)2 +( 1− θ)2(1 − 5η)]
(1 − θ)2(1 − 5η)
(50)
and if




LI ≡ 1 − (1 −
√




δ(1 − θ)2 +
4+3 δ + δη
1+δ(1 − η)
− 3( 5 3 )
Proof: See Appendix.
The above Proposition points out that the probability of facing a tough au-
thority plays a key role (in setting the ranking between the covenant equilibrium
and the late monopoly solution) when the cartel has limited information about
the type of authority in charge of antitrust policy. If this probability is suﬃciently
high then the expected welfare under PBEii is always greater than under PBEi.
The intuition is that a high probability of facing a tough authority increases the
probability that the cartel will never be engaged in price—ﬁxing and so it raises
up the expected welfare under PBEii. On the contrary, an equilibrium where the
covenant output is sometimes observed along the equilibrium path might domi-
nates Wii only if η is small, and if, as in the perfect information case, policy costs
are small, the discount factor is high and BC’s are suﬃciently tough.
As in the previous case, to compute the optimal BC’s policy, we need to
identify the relationships between χ and Σ and between α0 and αLI, shown in the
following Lemma.






while αLI < α0 if K ≥ χ; otherwise iﬀ K ≤ ΓLI and
δ >
A2




δ{δ()2(1 − 5η) − [1 + δ(1 − η)]A2
7[1 + δ(1 − η)]
(56)
Proof: See Appendix.
Now we can state the optimal level of BC’s under limited information.
Proposition 6 In case of limited information about the authority’s type, BC’s
are neutral in welfare terms when η > η2,s i n c eaP B E ( i) does not exist. If
instead η ≤ η2 then BC’s are eﬀective in modifying the decentralized equilibrium.
The optimal level of BC’s is: α∗ = α0 if η ≤ η2 < 1
5 and
{Γ
LI ≤ K<χ ≤ Σ and (55) holds};( 5 7 )
otherwise α∗ =0 . Last a third best welfare is achieved (i.e. a second best outcome
cannot be restored), as in the perfect information case, either when W i <W ii but
PBE(i) exists independently of α,o rw h e nWi ≥ Wii but α ¿ α0;f u r t h e r m o r ei t
is achieved when 1
5 ≤ η ≤ η2 and K ≥ χ (while a second best outcome is restored
if 1
5 ≤ η ≤ η2 and K<χ).
Proof: See Appendix.
Proposition 6 points out that the main diﬀerence in the optimal BC’s level
between the perfect and limited information cases is that in some circumstances
under the latter regime BC’s are welfare neutral. This happens when the prob-
ability of facing a tough authority is high, so that a covenant equilibrium under
limited information does not exist. Hence the welfare gains due to the authority’s
informational advantage make redundant the adoption of BC’s.
376.3 Model’s calibration: optimal level of BC’s under perfect informa-
tion
Under the values of the parameters shown in Table 1 but keeping α as a variable,
we have that: Λ = −0.098 + 0.116
√
1 − α +0 .058α, χ =0 .018, Υ = −0.039,
WLM =0 .042, A =0 .4a n dH = −0.011. Hence since K =0 .02 and so K>χ,w e
have, by Lemma 6, that a covenant equilibrium exists ∀α ∈ [0,1]. Furthermore,
we have that Φ =0 .031 and δ2 =0 .758, so that, since K<Φ, (33) holds.
Moreover, since δ =0 .95, δ > δ2 and (34) holds as well. Last, α =0 .614, so
that WCOV ≥ W LM if 0 ≤ α ≤ 0.614. Hence by Proposition 4 (note that χ < Φ
so that (39) holds, but χ <K<Φ) α∗ = 0. Under these circumstances the
authority can implement a second best welfare (if α > 0.614 a late monopoly
s o l u t i o nw o u l da r i s ea n dat h i r db e s tw e l f a r ew o u l db ea c h i e v e d )a n dW i =
0.437 > 0.435 = WCOV(α =0 .023).
7 Summary and conclusions
In this paper we have analyzed how a Hard Core Cartel can design a market
conduct avoiding the appearance of an agreement and, consequently, of incurring
in antitrust sanctions and remedies. We have shown that the cartel achieves this
goal by choosing a sequence of prices making evident that it is not engaged in an
excessive degree of collusion and that the latter will also persist in future periods.
We have labeled this conduct as “covenant”, i.e. a cartel’s informal obligation dis-
playing to the antitrust authority that the current “low” collusive activity has a
persistent eﬀect. This result conﬁrms Harrington’s [2004b] intuition that the car-
tel may choose ad hoc strategies to avoid the possibility of antitrust investigation.
However, the bulk of this opportunity does not lay, as in Harrington [2004b], in
limiting price changes across periods, but rather in sending the signal that no
price changes will ever be observed. Moreover, we have investigated a framework
where the cartel has limited information about the type of authority in charge of
antitrust policy, i.e. whether the authority is “tough” (e.g. her objective function
is only consumer surplus) or “accommodating”. We have shown that a suﬃciently
high chance of facing a tough authority will force the cartel to lose some proﬁt
38levels in comparison with the perfect information case, and will induce an equi-
librium path where it is not always possible to avoid the antitrust intervention.
This implies that society beneﬁts if asymmetric information favors the authority.
Last, we have also considered the possibility that the authority can precommit to
an ex—ante announced level of behavioral constraints (i.e. antitrust remedies or
injunction reliefs). We have shown that in this case the authority can modify the
decentralized equilibrium, i.e. the degree of collusion among the cartel’s members.
This conﬁrms some empirical evidence (Bizjak and Coles [1995]) that behavioral
constraints are the main concern of defendants in antitrust disputes. Under these
circumstances the optimal policy covers that behavioral constraints should be set
at their maximum level (i.e. post—conviction collusive proﬁts become negligible)
unless such a tight level would forbid the cartel to implement the collusive scheme
that the authority is willing to tolerate.
We can also drawn some interesting implications from the model presented
here. First, the eﬀectiveness of behavioral constraints in setting the prevailing
degree of collusion sheds light, as policy implication, on some important feature of
the European approach to antitrust disputes, in comparison with the US system.
T h ef o r m e rp a y sm o r ea t t e n t i o nt ob e h a v i o ral remedies (e.g. the recent imposition
to Microsoft to unbundle Windows Media Player from the Windows operating
system) than to ﬁnes (which usually are not sure, swift and substantial). Second,
since we have shown that investigations are more likely if there exists uncertainty
about the type of authority in charge of antitrust policy, an empirical prediction
that might be tested is that antitrust disputes should be more frequent when
a “new” authority is appointed (members of antitrust authority are subject to
a turnover). Last, another testable prediction produced by the model is that
investigations should be triggered by sudden and substantial price changes, while
no price variations over time should not lead to antitrust disputes.
398A p p e n d i x
Proof of Lemma 1:S u p p o s et h a tq2 <q c, i.e. the authority observes a collusive
output. If she chooses {i} social welfare is W(q2) − K; under the alternative
action social welfare is W(q2); then {ni} always dominates {i}.
2
P r o o fo fL e m m a2 : If the authority selects {i} at t =1w h e nq1 = qc social welfare
is W(qc)−K +δW(qm)( a tt = 2 by Lemma 1 the authority will not investigate
and so q2 = qm). If she chooses {ni} social welfare is W(qc)+δW(qm), → {ni}
always dominates {i} when q1 = qc.
2
P r o o fo fL e m m a3 : From (13) we require that (1 − m)(1 − θ)q1 − (1 − m)q2
1 +














(m − 1)2(1 − θ)2 − 4δ(m − 1)[π(ˆ q) − Ω]
2(m − 1)
But we require also that 0 <q 1 <q 2
1 or that q1




























(m − 1)2(1 − θ)2 − 4δ(m − 1)[π(ˆ q) − Ω]
2(m − 1)









(m − 1)2(1 − θ)2 − 4δ(m − 1)[π(ˆ q) − Ω]
2(m − 1)
(A.4)
Inequalities (A.1) and (A.3) are fulﬁlled only if m>1, while (A.2) and (A.4) are
veriﬁed if the following condition is true:




m<4Ω(1 + δ) − (1 − θ)




Note that G ≥ 0w o u l dr e q u i r e : Ω ≥
(1−θ)2
4 = π(qm), which implies that ad-
justment costs are greater than monopoly proﬁts. By excluding this unrealistic








and since π(ˆ q)=α
(1−θ)2)





4 | {z }
π(qm)
(A.6)















Rearranging it we get that the above inequality is true if: α < 1, which always
holds since, by assumption, 0 < α < 1. Hence N ¿ 0. Given that G<0a n d




4(1 + δ)Ω − (1 − θ)
2 − 4δπ(ˆ q)




41so that in order to exist an output q1 yielding positive proﬁts but also satis-
fying 0 <q 1 <q 2
1 and q1
1 <q 1 <q c, we need the following conditions to be
simultaneously fulﬁlled:
m>1,m >
4(1 + δ)Ω − (1 − θ)2 − 4δπ(ˆ q)
4Ω − (1 − θ)2 ≡
N
G
N e x t ,w es h o wt h a t1< N




4(1 + δ)Ω − (1 − θ)
2 − 4δπ(ˆ q)




i.e. 4Ω − (1 − θ)2 > 4(1 + δ)Ω − (1 − θ)2 − 4δπ(ˆ q), which can be written as




that is always true. Hence we require that (15) is fulﬁlled.
2
Proof of Proposition 1: (1) The cartel at C1 compares option (1) (i.e. {q1 =
qc,q 2 = qm}) and (3) (i.e. {q1 = q2 = q}). For {q1 = qc,q 2 = qm} to dominate
{q1 = q2 = q} we need that: δ[π(qmθ)−Ω] > (1+δ)π(q), which can be rewritten
as:
δ [π(q
mθ) − π(q) − Ω]
| {z }
L
> (1 + δ)π(q)
However note that, by deﬁnition of q and being q2
1 ≤ q ≤ q1
1,w eh a v et h a tL ¿ 0
(from (4)). Hence the above condition is never fulﬁlled and so {q1 = q2 = q}
strictly dominates {q1 = qc,q 2 = qm}. However it is necessary to investigate
whether there exists an output q such that q2
1 ≤ q ≤ q1
1. First we show that
q2




1/2 ≤ 1 − θ −
q
δ2(1 − θ)2[2(1 −
√









δ2(1 − θ)2[2(1 −
√
1 − α) − α]+8 δK
2δ
which may be rewritten as condition (16). Second, we require:
1 − θ −
q
δ2(1 − θ)2[2(1 −
√












δ2(1 − θ)2[2(1 −
√




which is, again, condition (16). This proves equilibrium (1).
(2) If (16) does not hold an output q2
1 ≤ q ≤ q1
1 no longer exists. Hence the only
option available at C1 is {q1 = qc,q 2 = qm}.
2
P r o o fo fL e m m a4 :I fq2 =ˆ q after q1 ∈ ]0,q[o ra f t e rq1 ∈ ]q1
1,qc[ the cartel’s
expected proﬁts are: η(1−m)[π(ˆ q)−Ω]+(1−η)[π(ˆ q)−Ω], which can be written
as (1 − ηm)[π(ˆ q) − Ω]. The latter is positive only if (17) holds.
2
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 : Since we have already shown that (19) always dominates
(21), we need to compare the following remaining options available to the cartel
at t =1 :( i )q1 ∈ ]0,q[o rq1 ∈ ]q1
1,qc[, which yields as overall proﬁts (18), (ii)
q1 = q,s ot h a ti tg e t s( 1 9 ) ,( i i i )q1 = qc, that leads to (22). Comparing (22) and
(18) implies that the former is higher than the latter if:
(1 − η)δ[π(q
m) − Ω] ≥ (1 − m)π(q1)+( 1− ηm)δ[π(ˆ q) − Ω]
By rearranging it we get:
(1 − η)δ[π(q




43Hence a suﬃcient condition to prove that (22) dominates (18) is:
(1 − η)δ[π(q
m) − Ω] > (1 − ηm)δ[π(ˆ q) − Ω]
which can be written as:
π(q
m) − π(ˆ q)
| {z }
>0






>0 | {z }
>0
> 0
which is always true. Hence q1 = qc always dominates q1 ∈ ]0,q[o rq1 ∈ ]q1
1,qc[.
We need now to check when q1 = qc dominates q1 = q. We have to investigate,
from (22) and (19), when
[1 + δ − η(m + δ)]π(q) < (1 − η)δ[π(q
m) − Ω]
which can be written as
η{δ[π(q
m) − Ω] − (m + δ)π(q)} < δ[π(q
m) − Ω] − (1 + δ)π(q)
Note that if there exists an output q1 = q such that q2
1 ≤ q ≤ q1
1 then, by
Proposition 1, δ[π(qm)−Ω] < (1+δ)π(q), and so the r.h.s. of the above inequality
is always negative. If we investigate the l.h.s., it is easy to see that it is negative
as well, since δ[π(qm) − Ω] < (1 + δ)π(q) < (m + δ)π(q)}, by Proposition 1 and
m>1. Hence we need to show when:
η{δ[π(q




m) − Ω] − (1 + δ)π(q)
| {z }
<0
The above is fulﬁlled if
η >
δ[π(qm) − Ω] − (1 + δ)π(q)
δ[π(qm) − Ω] − (m + δ)π(q)
Hence q1 = qc dominates q1 = q if the above inequality is true, while q1 = q




δ[π(qm) − Ω] − (1 + δ)π(q)
δ[π(qm) − Ω] − (m + δ)π(q)
44we obtain (1+δ) < (m+δ), which is always fulﬁlled. Hence we have: if η1 ≤ η ≤ 1
then {q1 = qc} dominates {q1 = q} because the latter strategy yields negative
proﬁts, if η2 < η < η1 then {q1 = qc} dominates {q1 = q} because the latter
strategy yields lower overall proﬁts than the former, while if 0 ≤ η ≤ η2 then
{q1 = q} dominates {q1 = qc}. This implies that if (23) holds then the cartel
ﬁnds proﬁtable to select q1 = q; it will then wait and observe the authority’s
response. If the latter is no investigation, the cartel is sure of facing type B and
so will maintain collusion at t = 2; if the authority investigates it means that the
cartel is facing type A and so it will select q2 = qc.T h i sp r o v e se q u i l i b r i u m( i).
If instead (23) is not satisﬁed, then the cartel chooses q1 = qc at t =1 ;i tw i l l
then observe the authority’s response. If no investigation is implemented, then
q2 = qm, while in the opposite case no collusion will take place also at t =2 .T h i s
proves equilibrium (ii).
2
P r o o fo fL e m m a5 : Wii ≥ W COV when
(1 + ηδ)W(q
c)+( 1− η)δW(q
m) ≥ (1 + δ)W(q)
which can be written as: ηδ[W(qc)−W(qm)] ≥ δ[W(q)−W(qm)]−[W(qc)−W(q)].
Solving it for η we get η ≥ η3,w h e r eη3 is deﬁned in (24). This inequality is always
fulﬁlled if η3 < 0, i.e. if δ[W(q)−W(qm)]−[W(qc)−W(q)] < 0. But this implies
that WCOV =( 1+δ)W(q) <W (qc)+δW(qm)=W LM.T h i s p r o v e s ( i). If
instead η3 ≥ 0w er e q u i r eη ≥ η3.N o t e t h a t η3 ¿ 1, since the latter implies
−δ[W(qc)+W(qm)] − [W(qc) − W(q)] ≤ 0, which is always true. This proves
(ii).
2
P r o o fo fL e m m a6 :I n8K
δ ≥ A2 − 2(1 − θ)2 +2 ( 1− θ)2√
1 − α +( 1− θ)2α we
impose that t ≡
√
1 − α, so that it becomes, after substituting and rearranging,
equal to: (1−θ)2(t−1)2 ≥ H,w h e r eH = A2− 8K
δ .N o w ,i fH ≤ 0 the inequality
is always veriﬁe d ;t h i si st r u ew h e nK ≥ χ.I f i n s t e a d H>0 (i.e. K<χ), we








1−θ.H o w e v e rt0
2 À 1 and so it has to be
ruled out. Hence t ≤ t1. Moreover we require that t0
1 > 0, and the latter is true
for K ≥ Υ.S i n c eΥ ¿ 0 the latter restriction is always veriﬁed. Hence we get
(31), while it is easy to show that 0 ≤ α0 ≤ 1.
2





and that WCOV i sad e c r e a s i n gf u n c t i o no fα. If we compare (26) and (32) we
get that W LM À WCOV
¯ ¯ ¯
α=1. By checking instead W COV
¯ ¯ ¯
α=0 ≥ WLM,w eg e t ,
after rearranging:
8(1 + δ)K − δ
2(1 − θ)
2 ≤ 0( A . 8 )




2K[2K +( 1− θ)2]
(1 − θ)2
and (35), so that (A.8) is fulﬁlled if δ ≤ δ1 or δ ≥ δ2 (clearly δ1 < δ2). Fur-
thermore, δ1 ¿ 0s i n c e8 ( 1− θ)2K À 0, while δ2 À 0, given that 4K +
2
q
2K[2K +( 1− θ)2] À 0. It is important to check whether δ2 ≤ 1, since
0 < δ ≤ 1b yd e ﬁnition. This condition implies that:
2
q
2K[2K +( 1− θ)2] ≤ (1 − θ)
2 − 4K
which is never fulﬁlled if K>
(1−θ)2
4 . Hence a ﬁrst identiﬁed condition to have
that WCOV
¯ ¯ ¯





Moreover, we require, to have δ2 ≤ 1, that 0 <K≤ Φ, and since the latter
condition is more stringent than condition (A.9) this proves (33). Last, if (33)
holds then δ2 ≤ 1, but we need that the discount factor is higher (or equal) than
this threshold level to have that W COV
¯ ¯ ¯
α=0 ≥ WLM, and this proves (34). Hence
46if (33)—(34) hold then WCOV
¯ ¯ ¯
α=0 ≥ W LM.B u t s i n c eWCOV
¯ ¯ ¯
α=1 ¿ W LM and
WCOV is a decreasing function of α, there exists a level of BC’s, deﬁned as α,



















Rearranging it we can write
2+2
√
1 − α ≥
8K





1 − α = t it is possible to rewrite the above inequality as follow:
t









and solving it for t we get: t1 =1−
√
1 − Z, t2 =1− +
√
1 − Z. t2 is ruled out
since 0 <t<1g i v e nt h a t0≤ α ≤ 1. To have a solution we require that 1 ≥ Z,
a n dt h i si sf u l ﬁlled if (33) holds. Then from t1 it is easy to get (37). Furthermore,
note that 0 ≤ α ≤ 1.
2
P r o o fo fL e m m a7 : From (30) and (33) we know that Υ < Φ given that Υ ¿ 0.
Next we compare (29) and (33), and we obtain that χ < φ if
χ =






which can be written as (39). Moreover, we want to show when α < α0.T h e









Rearranging it we get: H<(1 − θ)2(1 − Z). This inequality is always fulﬁlled
if H ≤ 0 . B u t ,a ss h o w ni nt h ep r o o fo fL e m m a6 ,H ≤ 0i fK ≥ χ. Hence if
47the latter inequality is true then α < α0 always. If instead H>0 (i.e. if K<χ),






δ(1 − θ)2 +
H
(1 − θ)2
which can be written, after substituting for H,a s
δ2(1 − θ)2
1+δ
> 8K + δA
2 − K
and solving for K we get (41). However, since K À 0, we need to show when
δ(1 − θ)2 − (1 + δ)A2 > 0. Solving it for δ we obtain (40).
2
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 : First, we assume that (39) holds. Hence we have to
explore 5 cases.
(i): χ ≤ K ≤ Φ and δ2 ≤ δ ≤ 1. This implies that a covenant equilibrium exists
∀α ∈ [0,1], and that WCOV ≥ WLM if 0 ≤ α ≤ α.S i n c eWCOV is decreasing in
α,t h ea u t h o r i t ys e t sα∗ =0 .S h em o d i ﬁes the decentralized equilibrium because
chooses the highest level of BC’s, and gets a second best welfare.
(ii): χ ≤ K ≤ Φ and δ < δ2. In this case a covenant equilibrium exists ∀α ∈ [0,1]
but WCOV <W LM ∀α ∈ [0,1]. Then α∗ = 0 but a second best welfare cannot
be restored (the authority would prefer the late monopoly solution but it is not
possible to use BC’s to destroy the covenant equilibrium).
(iii): K<χ ≤ Φ and δ2 ≤ δ ≤ 1. The covenant equilibrium exists ∀α ∈ [α0,1],
while WCOV ≥ WLM ∀α ∈ [0,α]. Hence, by Lemma 7, it becomes relevant
the relation between α and α0. This means that we have two sub—cases: (a)
K<Γ and δ > A2
(1−θ)2−A2. Under these circumstances α < α0, so that the α—
range where WCOV ≥ W LM does not overlap with the α—range where a covenant
equilibrium exists. So, α∗ = 0, but a late monopoly solution prevails not a
covenant equilibrium (the latter is the second best). (b)E i t h e rK ≥ Γ or δ ≤
A2
(1−θ)2−A2,s ot h a tα ≥ α0. The two relevant intervals overlap and α∗ = α0 (α∗ =0
cannot be imposed since a covenant equilibrium does not exist for such a tough
level of BC’s).
48(iv): K<χ ≤ Φ and δ < δ2. This implies that a covenant equilibrium exists
∀α ∈ [α0,1], while WCOV <W LM ∀α ∈ [0,1]. Then α∗ = 0 and second best
welfare is restored.
(v): χ ≤ Φ <Kand so δ2 > 1. In this case a covenant equilibrium exists
∀α ∈ [0,1] but WCOV <W LM ∀α ∈ [0,1]. Hence α∗ =0 ,b u t ,a si nc a s e( ii), it
is not possible to restore second best welfare though BC’s.
Next, we assume that (39) does not hold, so that Φ < χ.W eh a v et oe x p l o r e
4c a s e sh e r e .
(i): Φ <K<χ and so δ2 > 1. The covenant equilibrium exists ∀α ∈ [α0,1] but
WCOV <W LM ∀α ∈ [0,1]. Hence α∗ = 0, the covenant equilibrium is destroyed
through BC’s and second best welfare is restored.
(ii): Φ < χ ≤ K and so δ2 > 1. In this case a covenant equilibrium exists
∀α ∈ [0,1] but WCOV <W LM ∀α ∈ [0,1]. Then α∗ = 0 but it is not possible to
destroy the covenant equilibrium, and so second best cannot be restored.
(iii): K ≤ Φ < χ and δ2 ≤ δ ≤ 1. This implies that covenant equilibrium exists
∀α ∈ [α0,1], while WCOV ≥ W LM ∀α ∈ [0,α]. Hence, by Lemma 7, it becomes
relevant the relation between α and α0. This means that we have two sub—cases:
(a) K<Γ and δ > A2
(1−θ)2−A2.I n t h i s c a s e α < α0 a n ds ot h et w oi n t e r v a l sd o
not overlap. Consequently, α∗ = 0, a late monopoly solution arises even if the
authority prefers the covenant equilibrium. (b)E i t h e rK ≥ Γ or δ ≤ A2
(1−θ)2−A2,
so that α ≥ α0. The two relevant intervals overlap and α∗ = α0 (α∗ =0c a n n o t
be imposed since a covenant equilibrium does not exist for such a tough level of
BC’s). A second best welfare is restored.
(iv): K ≤ Φ < χ and δ < δ2. The covenant equilibrium exists ∀α ∈ [α0,1] but
WCOV <W LM ∀α ∈ [0,1]. Hence α∗ = 0, the covenant equilibrium is destroyed
through BC’s and second best welfare is restored.
2
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5 : F r o m( 4 7 )i ti sc l e a rt h a ti fη ≥ 1
5 then Wii >W i
∀α ∈ [0,1]. If instead η < 1
5 (47) can be written as:
8[1 + δ(1 − η)] − δ
2(1 − θ)
2(1 − 5η) < 0




4(1 − η)K − 2
q
2K[2K(1 − η)2 +( 1− θ)2(1 − 5η)]
(1 − θ)2(1 − 5η)
and (50), with δLI
1 < δLI
2 .M o r e o v e rδLI
1 ¿ 0 since rearranging the numerator we
get
0 < 2K(1 − θ)




2 À 0. Last δLI
2 ≤ 1 implies as necessary condition that
K ≤
(1 − θ)2(1 − 5η)
4(1 − η)
and, if the above condition holds, it also requires that (48) is satisﬁed. This
proves (1). Next, if (48) holds it is also necessary that (49) is satisﬁed; this
proves (2). Last, we need to identify the α—range where Wi ≥ Wii, i.e. when













(4 + 3δ + δη)
which can be written, after rearranging, as
2+2
√
1 − α + α ≥
8K
δ(1 − θ)2 +




1 − α ≡ t we can write, after substituting and rearranging,





1 − J (which has to be ruled out since 0 ≤ t ≤ 1). Note that we
need 1 ≥ J a n dt h i si sf u l ﬁlled when both (48)—(49) hold. Hence t1 yields (52)
and, consequently, (51). This proves (3). Note that 0 ≤ αLI ≤ 1.
2




(1 − θ)2(1 − 5η)
8(2 + η2 − 2η)









which can be written as H<(1 − θ)2(1 − J). Clearly, if H ≤ 0t h e nαLI ≤ α0
∀α ∈ [0,1]. The latter is true if K ≥ χ.I f i n s t e a d H>0, then the above
inequality can be written, after rearranging and substituting for H,a s
δ2(1 − θ)2(1 − 5η)
1+δ(1 − η)
> 7K + δA
2
and solving it for K we get K<ΓLI. However, since K À 0 we need to verify
that ΓLI is positive. The latter is true when (55) holds.
2
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n6 : We have to consider six cases (and within each of them
several subcases):
(1): η < 1
5 ≤ η.I n t h i s c a s e P B E ( i)d o e sn o te x i s t∀α ∈ [0,1] and W i <W ii
∀α ∈ [0,1]. Hence α∗ ∈ [0,1] and BC’s are irrelevant.
(2): 1
5 ≤ η2 < η. The analysis is similar to case (1).
(3): 1
5 ≤ η ≤ η2. Under these circumstances PBE(i)e x i s t s∀α ∈ [0,1] if K ≥ χ,
and if α0 ≤ α ≤ 1o t h e r w i s e .H e n c ew eh a v et w os u b c a s e s :
(i): K ≥ χ. T h i si m p l i e st h a tP B E ( i)e x i s t s∀α ∈ [0,1] and Wi <W ii
∀α ∈ [0,1]. So α∗ =0 ,P B E ( i) cannot be destroyed and a third best welfare
is achieved. However the authority sets the highest achievable level of welfare
under PBE(i). d (ii): K<χ, i.e. a situation where PBE(i)e x i s t∀α ∈ [α0,1] and
Wi <W ii ∀α ∈ [0,1]. Consequently α∗ =0 ,P B E ( i) is destroyed and a second
best welfare is reached.
(4): η ≤ η2 < 1
5. Under these circumstances PBE(i)e x i s t s∀α ∈ [0,1] if K ≥ χ,
and if α0 ≤ α ≤ 1 otherwise. Moreover, Wi ≥ Wii if K ≤ Σ,δLI
2 ≤ δ ≤ 1,0 ≤
51α ≤ αLI.S i n c ew ek n o wt h a tK ≤ Σ depends upon condition (54), we have the
following subcases:
(i): (54) holds. Hence we have the following subcases:
(a): χ ≤ K ≤ Σ and δLI
2 ≤ δ ≤ 1. In this case PBE(i)e x i s t s∀α ∈ [0,1]
while W i ≥ Wii ∀α ∈ [0,αLI]. Then α∗ = 0 and a second best welfare is reached.
(b): χ ≤ K ≤ Σ and δ < δLI
2 . This implies that PBE(i)e x i s t s∀α ∈ [0,1]
and that Wi <W ii ∀α ∈ [0,1]. Then α∗ = 0 and a second best welfare cannot
be restored.
(c): K<χ ≤ Σ and δLI
2 ≤ δ ≤ 1. With these parameters’ intervals
PBE(i)e x i s t s∀α ∈ [α0,1] while W i ≥ Wii ∀α ∈ [0,αLI]. Again we have two
subcases:
(∗): K<ΓLI and (55) holds. In this case αLI < α0 and so α∗ =0 :a
third best welfare is achieved.
(+): K ≥ ΓLI or (55) does not hold. Under these circumstances
αLI ≥ α0 and so α∗ = α0; a second best welfare is restored.
(d): K<χ ≤ Σ and δ < δLI
2 . This implies that PBE(i)e x i s t s∀α ∈ [α0,1]
while W i <W ii ∀α ∈ [0,1]. Then α∗ = 0 and a second best welfare is reached.
(e): χ ≤ Σ <Kso that δLI
2 > 1. With this K—interval PBE(i)e x i s t s
∀α ∈ [0,1] and W i <W ii ∀α ∈ [0,1]. Then α∗ = 0 and a third best welfare is
achieved.
(ii): (54) does not hold. The subcases to analyze are the following ones:
(a): Σ <K<χ so that δLI
2 > 1. Hence PBE(i)e x i s t s∀α ∈ [α0,1] but
Wi <W ii ∀α ∈ [0,1]. Consequently α∗ =0a n dP B E ( i) is destroyed, getting a
second best welfare.
(b): Σ < χ ≤ K so that δLI
2 > 1. This implies that PBE(i)e x i s t s
∀α ∈ [0,1] but Wi <W ii ∀α ∈ [0,1]. Consequently α∗ =0s i n c eP B E ( i)c a n n o t
be destroyed, and the authority limits the welfare losses in a third best outcome.
(c): K ≤ Σ < χ and δLI
2 ≤ δ ≤ 1. In this case PBE(i)e x i s t s∀α ∈ [α0,1]
and W i ≥ Wii ∀α ∈ [0,αLI]. Consequently we need to investigate two subcases:
(∗): K<ΓLI and (55) holds. In this case αLI < α0 and so α∗ =0 :a
third best welfare is achieved.
52(+): K ≥ ΓLI or (55) does not hold. Under these circumstances
αLI ≥ α0 and so α∗ = α0; a second best welfare is restored.
(d): K ≤ Σ < χ and δ < δLI
2 . This implies that PBE(i)e x i s t s∀α ∈ [α0,1]
while W i <W ii ∀α ∈ [0,1]. Then α∗ = 0 and a second best welfare is reached.
(5): η2 < η < 1
5. Under these circumstances PBE(i)d o e sn o te x i s t∀α ∈ [0,1]
and W i ≥ Wii if K ≤ Σ,δLI
2 ≤ δ ≤ 1, 0 ≤ α ≤ αLI. Hence we need to investigate
the following subcases:
(i): K ≤ Σ and δLI
2 ≤ δ ≤ 1. In this case PBE(i)d o e sn o te x i s t∀α ∈ [0,1]
while Wi ≥ Wii ∀α ∈ [0,αLI]. Hence α∗ =[ 0 ,1] and BC’s are irrelevant since a
third best welfare is always achieved.
(ii): K ≤ Σ and δ < δLI
2 . With these intervals PBE(i)d o e sn o te x i s t∀α ∈
[0,1] while W i <W ii ∀α ∈ [0,1]. Hence α∗ =[ 0 ,1] and BC’s are irrelevant and
a second best welfare is always achieved.
(iii): K>Σ so that δLI
2 > 1. This subcase is similar to subcase (ii).
(6): η < 1
5 < η2. Under these circumstances PBE(i)e x i s t s∀α ∈ [0,1] if K ≥ χ
and ∀α ∈ [α0,1] otherwise. Moreover, Wi ≥ W ii if K ≤ Σ,δLI
2 ≤ δ ≤ 1,
0 ≤ α ≤ αLI. The analysis of all the possible subcases is similar to case (4).
2
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